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The Pell Grant program is the largest means-tested financial assistance available 
to postsecondary students across the United States.  Students from all types of degree 
granting post-secondary institutions can apply for Pell grants. In 2000-01, the federal 
government awarded almost $8 billion in Pell grants among more than 3.8 million 
students, roughly one-third of all college students ( College Board 2001). President 
Bush’s 2003 budget allocates over $10.9 billion dollars for an estimated 4.5 million Pell 
grant recipients (DOE 2002) potentially representing a 32.4 percent increase in the 
number of students receiving Pell grants since the 1990-91 school year.  Yet despite this 
continued expansion of Pell, researchers have only limited evidence on the causal effects 
of these grants. 
Most Pell-related research focuses on the effects of Pell Grants on enrollment 
decisions, specifically focusing on initial enrollment and choice amongst colleges (see 
Kane 1999, Ehrenberg and Sherman 1984, Leslie and Brinkman 1987, Seftor and Turner 
2002).  However, there is surprisingly little research measuring the causal effect of Pell 
grants on student outcomes in college (e.g. persistence, graduation).  Regardless of 
whether Pell grants affect initial enrollment patterns, Pell grants may independently affect 
student outcomes. 
Moreover, studying the effects of need-based aid on student outcomes may also 
be important since Pell-eligible students are more likely to be on the margin of “stopping-
out.”
1  At Ohio 4-year colleges in 1999-2000, 18 percent of full-time freshmen who were 
not eligible for Pell Grants withdrew from college by the next year while 28 percent of 
students who were eligible for a Pell grant did not enroll the following year.  It is an open 
                                                                 
1 “Stopping-out” refers to students who withdraw from school after their first year.  These students are not 
“drop-outs” since many of these students do not leave school permanently and their undergraduate credit 
hours do not “expire.”  I use these terms interchangeably throughout the paper.   2
question whether Pell grants and other need-based aid programs affect these margins.  
This paper attempts to resolve these questions.  Using unique student data from Ohio, this 
paper measures the causal relationship between need-based aid and student retention.  
A study of the effects of need-based aid on student retention may be of interest to 
both policymakers and educational researchers.  As Sarah Turner argues elsewhere in this 
volume, policymakers have often paid more attention to improving student access to 
college rather than improving student retention once in college.  However, as college 
enrollment rates continue to increase while completion rates do n ot, both policymakers 
and researchers have begun focusing more heavily on indicators of student retention (e.g. 
DesJardins, Ahlburg, McCall 1999, St. John, Hu, Tuttle 2000, St. John, Hu, Weber 2000), 
and the relationship between financial need and persistence is central to many of these 
studies (e.g. DesJardins, Ahlburg, MccCall 2002, St. John, Musoba, Simmons 2003). 
There are a number of reasons why more research has not investigated the effects 
of Pell grants on student collegiate outcomes.  One reason is that researchers have 
difficulty distinguishing between the effects of family characteristics and the effects of 
Pell grants.  Pell grants are a means-tested program.  Comparisons between Pell 
recipients and non-Pell recipients (e.g. Wei and Carroll 2002) may be difficult to interpret 
since Pell recipients are poorer and may be more likely to drop-out even in the absence of 
need-based aid.  To correct for such bias, researchers must sufficiently control for family 
characteristics. 
Additionally, identifying the effects of Pell grants is difficult since much of the 
variation in the size of students’ Pell grants is correlated with students’ college 
enrollment decisions.  For example, college choice and the size of a students’ Pell grant   3
are directly connected.  Students who attend more expensive (and often higher quality) 
schools are eligible for larger Pell grants than students at other colleges or universities.  
Pell grants are also more generous for full-time rather than part-time students.    Even in 
the absence of Pell grants, students who benefit most from college are more likely than 
other students to attend more expensive schools and to attend full-time.  However, since 
Pell grant awards are systematically higher for these same students, it may be difficult to 
identify the effects of the Pell grant separate from college enrollment effects.  To avoid 
this bias, researchers must exploit variation in Pell grants that is independent of college 
choice (e.g. discontinuities in the Pell formula). 
A final reason that researchers have been unable to identify the effects of Pell 
grants on outcomes is the absence of accurate data, in particular, the absence of accurate 
persistence and detailed financial data.  Some researchers have measured persistence at a 
particular university; however, in these data, researchers cannot distinguish between a 
student who transferred to another school and one who withdraws from college.  Other 
survey-based data rely on students’ self-reports of their college experience.  These data 
may not be as reliable as administrative data since students may not recall or do not wish 
to report small periods of time when they withdrew from college.   
Financial data is equally as difficult to obtain.  Most of the students who receive 
Pell grants do not attend elite, expensive institutions, nor do they have substantial family 
support.  Pell recipients (and much of the variation in their awards) typically come from 
less expensive colleges and their family contributions are much smaller.  Moreover, the 
variation in Pell grants is typically small.  Exact financial data are necessary both to 
identify the small variations in Pell grants and to employ creative identification strategies.    4
Survey data (e.g. High School and Beyond, National Educational Longitudinal Survey) 
do not offer the level of detail necessary to identify accurately the level of students’ Pell 
grants. 
To examine the effects of Pell, this paper presents evidence from data gathered by 
the Ohio Board of Regents (OBR).  These data do not have the shortcomings of other 
datasets and offer a level of detail on both persistence and financial variables that is not 
available in other data.  Since 1998, OBR has collected comprehensive data on college 
enrollment in Ohio’s public 2- and 4-year colleges.  As a result, the OBR data tracks 
students within and across schools.  With the data, researchers can distinguish between 
students who withdraw from school and students who transfer to other Ohio schools.  
Moreover, through collaborative agreements, OBR has expanded the data to include 
students’ ACT scores and data from the Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA).  The FAFSA data are the exact data used by institutions to determine the 
amount of students’ Pell grant eligibility.   
 The level of detail in the financial data also facilitates the use of statistical tools 
that are impractical using other data.  In particular, the level of detail allows researchers 
to identify small discontinuities in the Pell grant formula.  These discontinuities may be 
exploited to identify the causal effects of the voucher.  While this paper may not 
completely resolve biases from college choice/enrollment or family background, the 
discontinuity analysis may be the best available method for dealing with such biases. 
The paper presents evidence on the effects of Pell grants using both panel and 
cross-sectional variation.
2  The panel specifications suggest that need-based financial aid 
                                                                 
2 It is important to distinguish between the effects of Pell grants in general and the effects of Pell grants 
conditional on initial enrollment.  This paper focuses on estimating the effect of persistence conditional on   5
reduces students’ stop-out behavior.  In identifying this effect, the paper shows that 
students who receive Pell grants after their first year are a unique subset of students who 
applied for financial aid in their first year.  Failure to control for this selection may 
confound causal estimates of the Pell grant program. 
The paper also presents evidence relying on cross-sectional variation.  The paper 
estimates the effects of Pell grants close to existing discontinuities in family size.  The 
results based on discontinuity approaches suggest that Pell grants reduce college drop-out 
rates; however, the results are not robust to alternative specifications. 
Section 1 of this paper presents a simple economic model of student persistence 
under uncertainty.  Section 2 of the paper explains the OBR data in greater detail.  
Section 3 of the paper presents the empirical strategies and results. Section 4 discusses 
policy implications of the results and concludes. 
 
I.  Economic Model 
Economists often model educational attainment as investment in human capital.  
Even basic economics classes teach that students will choose an education level that 
maximizes the expected present discounted value (PDV) of future wage payments less 
the expected PDV of educational costs.  There have been a number of permutations to 
this model – factoring in scholarship aid, allowing the returns to education to vary, and 
showing how predicted education levels vary with expectations (Manski 1993).  This 
paper investigates the relationship between financial aid and outcomes.  Rather than use a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
a student having enrolled.  I discuss below the relationship between the conditional effects of Pell and the 
unconditional effects.   6
traditional human capital model, the paper models students’ dropout behavior using a 
multi-stage investment model. 
Multi-stage investment models are particularly useful in cases where the agent 
must reevaluate the project after an initial period of time.  For example, Myers and Majd 
(1990) investigate o ptimal abandonment rules for firms.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
review other examples of multi-stage investments. 
The phenomenon of interest – students’ stop-out behavior – is similar to these 
multi-stage investments.  In the initial period, students must decide whether or not to 
attend the first year of college.  After completion of the first year, students must then 
reevaluate whether or not to complete the next year.  About 20 percent of first-time 
freshmen withdraw from 4-year colleges after the first year. 
To formalize the model, let person i's wage at time t ( wit) be modeled as a 
function of years of college (st) and ability (ai) which is not perfectly known to the 
student.  Let the cost of education at time t (ct) be the difference between announced 
tuition (Tt) and financial aid.  Financial aid contains two components:  the need-based 
component is a function of initial wealth (I0) and the number of children attending college 
at time t (nt); the merit-based component is a function of perceived ability at time t.  Let 
Et[] denote the expectation operator conditional on information at time t. 
wit=f(sit,,ai)                (1) 
ct= Tt  - g(I0,nt) - h(ai)              (2) 
A student will attend a 1
st year of college if the expected value of increased 
lifetime earnings for that year exceeds the cost of attending college (including foregone 
earnings).   7
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At the start of the first year, a student will indicate an intention to attend a second 
year as well so long as 
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We could solve the decision rules for the maximum tuition level that a student 
would be willing to pay.  For simplicity, let’s assume that tuition is fully known one year 
in advance. 
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These tuition levels are likely the formulae that students use to make any 
decisions about the second year of school that must be made during the first year.  For 
example, a student wanting to transfer to another university must file that application 
during the first year.  Also, students who want financial aid in their second year must file 
applications during their first year.  With these types of decisions in mind, there are a few 
insights that come from comparing these two tuition values: 
1.  For a given level of ability, if the returns to schooling are linear (or even concave) 
in schooling and scholarship aid does not change, then the maximum tuition that a 
student will pay falls over time.  Hence, many students may rationally choose to 
get only one year of school.   8
2.  Even if the returns to schooling are convex and scholarship aid does not change, 
then the maximum tuition a student is willing to pay may still decrease over time 
leading to more planned attrition.
3 
3.  Even expected changes in financial aid can alter the maximum that students 
would be willing to pay leading to students to plan on withdrawing or 
transferring. 
4.  Since students must apply for 2
nd year financial aid during their first year, they 
will do so only if they perceive that their benefits exceed costs in both periods.
4 
There are also a number of decisions about the second year that can be made after 
the first year – for example, the decision to withdraw from college altogether.  Students 
make these decisions after gaining another year of information by which to base their 
decisions.  The student will choose to attend another year if the expected value of the 
increase in lifetime earnings for the 2
nd year exceeds the cost of attending college that 
year (including foregone earnings). 
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We could rewrite this decision rule solving for the maximum tuition levels that the 
student would be willing to pay in order to actually attend a given year of college: 
                                                                 
3 Holding scholarship aid constant and as T?8, the maximum tuition rises only if the following inequality 
is satisfied: 
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If in the extreme case, there is a “sheepskin” effect of a degree (i.e. returns only to a 2- or 4-year degree), 
then the inequality is always satisfied.   Typical models of sequential investment show that the willingness 
to pay increases over time.  The key difference is the usability of capital.  Students may be able to drop out 
of colleges and use a year of college in the labor market. 
4 There may be a small group who apply for financial aid even though they expect not to attend the second 
year.  There is an option value to applying for financial aid since ability is not known perfectly (see 
discussion by Sarah Turner elsewhere in this volume).   9
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Notice that the difference between equation (8) and (6) is the information set.  Students 
have a chance to update their expectations with information from their first year of 
school.  As the model stands, the updating comes in terms of ability.  Similar to the 
model in Manski (1993), students discover their ability by attending college.  Knowing 
the ability then changes the willingness to pay. 
We could have also changed this model by introducing uncertainty in the financial 
aid formula.  Unexpected changes in financial aid might lower the maximum tuition price 
that students might be willing to pay.  For example, if a students’ expected financial aid 
offer falls, the maximum that a student would be willing to pay declines.  The student 
may wish to transfer to a cheaper school or drop-out altogether. 
A simple insight of the model is that changes in financial aid matter.  Previous 
work on the effects of financial aid has looked at relationships between student outcomes 
and both changes and levels of aid.  Recent work by Wetzel, O’Toole, and Peterson 
(1999) look at changes in financial aid for students at Virginia Commonwealth 
University.  They find that increases in need-based financial aid likely improved student 
retention.  Other work by Singell (2001) looks at the effects of the level of financial aid in 
the first year.    He finds that the higher students’ levels of need-based financial aid, the 
more likely the student is to graduate. 
While the model in this paper suggests that decisions about enrollment in the 
second year rely on financial aid changes rather than levels, there may be reasons that the 
level of financial aid in the first year matters.  If the level of financial aid in the first year 
creates some inertia or helps to shape expectations about the financial aid offer in the   10 
second period, the level may affect the student in the next year.  One example of this type 
of effect is the application for 2
nd year financial aid.  The higher a students’ Pell grant in 
the first year, the more likely the student will apply for a 2
nd year award.  If students 
expect to get a low 2
nd year award, they may never even apply for financial aid. 
The level of financial aid may even have deleterious consequences on the student.  
The model implicitly assumes that financial aid does not change students’ behavior in 
other ways.  But for example, if a student receives financial aid, he or she may be more 
“detached” from college.  The student may not fully engage and take college seriously 
since his/her money is not “on the line.”  In this way, Pell grants eliminate the “sunk cost 
fallacy” for the student.
5  Since Pell grant recipients did not make this initial investment 
(the Federal government did instead), they may not have as strong of an incentive to work 
hard in school as students who made this initial investment themselves.  As a result, Pell 
recipients may perform worse.  The model may capture some of this through the 
“updates” on students’ abilities.  Controlling for students performance in school gives a 
clear indicator of whether they are exerting effort or not.  The empirical results will 
investigate this hypothesis more fully. 
Although they are outside of the scope of this paper, there are other outcomes in 
which we might be interested that are related to either the level or change in financial aid.  
For example, we might be interested in how financial aid affects the number of credits 
that a student successfully attempts.  Students without financial aid may be reluctant to 
take loans and may spend more time working on the side.  On the other hand, students 
without financial aid may want to “cram” in more credits per semester to try to reduce the 
                                                                 
5 The “sunk cost fallacy” suggests that people often devote greater resources and more effort in areas where 
they have already made an investment.     11 
number of semesters they have to attend (and as a result the total cost of college).  We 
might also be interested in knowing how GPA’s vary with financial aid.  In particular, if 
the level of financial aid affects hours attempted, completed or grade point averages, it 
might also affect students’ perception of their abilities and, in the context of the model 
above, affect their likelihood of completing college. 
 
II.  Data 
The data for this project come from the Ohio Board of Regents (OBR).  Through 
a collaborative agreement with the OBR, the OBR has allowed me to access anonymous 
student data from Ohio’s public institutions.  The data are provided by the respective 
institutions to the OBR and include information on student demographics, enrollment, 
credit hours completed, and grade point averages. 
OBR has collaborative arrangements with other agencies that allow them to 
expand the data.  For example, OBR links the student records to ACT and SAT records.  
Most Ohio students take the ACT exam, and the ACT records include the highest test 
score of the student and the most recent responses to the ACT survey (which includes 
student-reported data on high school performance).  OBR also links students to their 
respective FAFSA.  The FAFSA data include detailed information about the finances of 
both students and their families.  From the FAFSA, the variable of most interest is the 
“estimated family contribution” that colleges use to award grants based on financial need. 
One important limitation of the data is that they only include information about 
need-based financial aid.  From FAFSA data, we know students’ eligibility for federal 
grants and loans.  We also know students’ eligibility for Ohio’s Instructional Grant   12 
program, a state-run need-based financial aid award.  The data do not include information 
about merit-based financial aid.  Ohio institutions are reluctant to divulge merit-based 
awards since these rewards are central to their recruitment strategies.  While I do not 
observe merit aid, I observe students’ GPA’s once in college, their ACT scores, and their 
(self-reported) high school GPA’s.  If these variables adequately control for student 
ability and if colleges determine need- and merit-based awards separately, then not 
knowing students’ merit-based awards should not affect the estimated results. 
Another limitation of the data is that they only include students attending Ohio 
public universities.  Students from Ohio that attend universities in other states, including 
the nation’s elite schools, and students that attend private schools in Ohio are excluded 
from the sample.
6  These exclusions are both a weakness and a strength of these data.  
Excluding elite students makes it so the results may not be generalizeable to all college 
students; however, excluding elite students gives us the opportunity to describe how 
financial aid affects students at non-elite schools.  These non-elite schools educate the 
majority of college students and may be places where financial constraints are more 
binding.  
Another concern related to the inclusion of Ohio public institutions alone is the 
measurement of drop-out behavior.  Students who transfer from Ohio public institutions 
to institutions located in other states are indistinguishable in the data from students who 
withdraw from Ohio public universities.   This potential bias, however, should be very 
                                                                 
6 Ohio State University and Miami University are the top ranked public universities in Ohio.  In the 2004 
version of US News and World Reports’ college rankings, they rank 60
th and 64
th respectively among 
national universities with doctoral programs.  Other high ranking institutions in Ohio (e.g. Oberlin) are 
private colleges.   13 
small since the percentage of students who likely transferred makes up a small fraction of 
the total number of observed dropouts.
7   
I focus entirely on the incoming freshman class in 1999-2000 school year.  These 
are the first students for whom FAFSA data are available through the OBR.  I include 
students who enrolled in any college, including community colleges, for the first time in 
1999, and I track these students through the 2000-2001 school year. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample.  At 4-year institutions, about 
10 percent of incoming full-time freshman are from other states, and students are much 
less likely to be commuter students than at 2-year colleges.  At 2-year colleges, which 
include local and state-run community colleges and technical colleges, about 2 percent of 
all students live on campus.  Similar to other national surveys, the average age of first 
time freshman at 2 -year colleges is considerably higher than at 4 -year colleges, and 
students complete fewer semester hours in their first year (13 at 4 -year colleges as 
compared to 11 at 2-year colleges. 
Seventy-five percent of incoming freshman at Ohio’s 4-year colleges took the 
ACT exam while only 45 percent of students at 2-year colleges took the exam.  The 4-
year college students performed better than the 2-year college students.  Throughout the 
paper, I will at times restrict the sample to students who took the ACT exam.  Not only 
do I know these students test scores, but I also have additional (self-reported) data on 
these students’ high school experiences. 
                                                                 
7 The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) tracks the number of transfers at each 
institution but does not record the state of residence of transfer students although it does track the states of 
residence for incoming freshman.  Assuming that transfer students are geographically representative of the 
incoming freshman class, then one would expect around 650 Ohio students to transfer to the non-Ohio 
schools with substantial Ohio enrollments.  If we further assume that all 650 transfer students just finished 
their first year of school, then about 4.3 percent of observed dropouts are actually transfer students.     14 
Throughout the paper, I will also restrict the sample at times to those students 
who filed a FAFSA in both Fall 1999 and Fall 2000.  About 65 percent of 4-year students 
and 63 percent of 2-year students submitted FAFSA’s in 1999; however, only 49 percent 
and 40 percent respectively filed FAFSA’s in 2000.  As explained below, not observing 
FAFSA data for many applicants leads to substantial biases in the results using panel 
identification. The average, uncovered financial need is small across all students, but 
conditional on it being positive, the uncovered financial need is slightly greater than 
$1400 for students at 4-year schools. 
Table 2 shows some basic least-squares regressions of student stop-out behavior 
on the level of students’ financial aid.  These regressions are not meant to show the 
causal effect of Pell grants, but rather to demonstrate associations between the stop-out 
behavior, financial aid awards and other covariates.  These regressions are also useful in 
understanding the types of biases present in the data.  Comparing the various 
specifications will help identify important biases. 
Column 1 shows a regression of whether a student drops out or not regressed on 
the student’s financial aid award.  The regression includes fixed effects that control for 
the school that the student attends.  The estimated coefficient is positive and significant 
suggesting that larger awards are positively associated with drop-out behavior.  As 
mentioned before, however, these coefficients are significantly biased for a number of 
reasons.  For example, when we include controls for an individual’s socio-economic 
background and personal characteristics in Columns 2, the estimated relationship drops 
significantly.
8  The estimated relationship drops dramatically (from .033 to .006) and is 
                                                                 
8 The sample sizes fall across columns in Table 2.  The first column includes all students in the sample.  
The second column includes only those students for whom demographic data are available.  Columns 3 and   15 
still significant.  Column 5 is similar to Column 2 except that I focus only on students 
who took the ACT exam, including controls for a student’s high school performance and 
entrance exam scores.  The estimated coefficient is similar to Column 2 but is no longer 
significant.   The other rows in Columns 2 and 5 suggest that wealthier students are less 
likely to stop-out; out-of-state students are more likely to drop-out; older students and 
men are more likely to withdraw; and students living on campus and students who took 
the ACT (and performed well on it) are less likely to stop-out.   
In Column 3, I add controls for students’ grades during their freshman years of 
school.  As previously mentioned, Pell may have had a negative effect since students with 
Pell may have had less of a financial commitment to schooling and may not have worked 
as hard.  Including grade point average should control for these students and may further 
weaken the estimated relationship between financial aid and stop-out behavior.  As 
shown in Table 2, the estimated relationship is smaller than in Columns 1, 2, and 5.  The 
result is also not statistically different than zero.  In Column 6, I estimate a similar 
regression for students who took the ACT exam.  Again, the estimated relationship is 
indistinguishable from zero. 
In Column 4, I estimate the relationship controlling for personal and family 
characteristics and grades during a student’s first year.  I exclude the fixed effects for 
students’ campuses of attendance.  These fixed effects also control for differences in 
quality, price, and other unobservable campus characteristics (e.g. the strength of a 
campuses freshman intervention programs).  These fixed effects control for the fact that 
students attending lower quality schools (who also receive smaller financial aid awards 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 further restrict the sample to students who had a freshman GPA reported to the Ohio Board of Regents.  
Columns 5 and 6 are based on the subsample of students who took the ACT exam.   16 
since tuition is smaller) are more likely to withdraw than students attending better schools 
(who receive higher financial aid awards for similar reasons).  Without these fixed 
effects, we would expect the estimated relationship between financial aid and student 
stop-out behavior to be even smaller and maybe even negative.  This is exactly what 
Column 4 of Table 2 shows.  The estimated relationship suggests that higher financial aid 
awards are negatively associated with student stop-out behavior. 
 
III.  Estimating the Causal Effects 
There are three sources of variation that economists can use to identify the effects 
of Pell grants:  time series, panel, and cross-sectional.  In this section, I discuss the 
feasibility of each of these identification strategies using the Ohio Board of Regents data.  
I also present the basic empirical results for each identification strategy. 
Each strategy aims at identifying the effects of Pell grants conditional on initial 
enrollment.  However, Pell grants may affect enrollment, and as a consequence, some 
students who would not be enrolled without Pell grants would be included in the analysis 
making the parameter estimated in this paper more difficult to interpret.  If Pell affects 
enrollments, then the parameter estimated in this paper would be a combination of two 
different effects – 1) the effect of Pell grants on the persistence behavior of students who 
would have attended college in the absence of the Pell and 2) the effect of Pell grants on 
the persistence behavior of students who would not have attended school without the Pell 
grant.    
Under some circumstances, the latter effect does not matter.  For example, any 
potential bias depends on the degree to which Pell grants affect enrollment.  If the Pell   17 
grant has no effect, then the parameter estimated in this paper represents only the effect 
of the Pell grant on all students eligible for Pell grants.  If the Pell grant has a small 
effect, than any bias in the estimated parameter is likely to be small.  Most of the research 
on Pell grants and enrollment suggest that the Pell has had either no effect or a very small 
positive effect on enrollment (see Kane 1999, Leslie and Brinkman 1987).   
Additionally, if the unobservable factors that can potentially bias any estimate of 
the effect of Pell grants on persistence are similar for those people for whom Pell 
influenced enrollment decisions and those people for whom they did not, then the effect 
of Pell grants estimated in this paper should be the same for both groups.   For example, 
suppose that unobservable family characteristics affect both the size of students’ Pell 
grants and their likelihood of dropping out.  We typically think that these unobserved 
characteristics likely bias our estimate of the effects of Pell grants downward.  If the bias 
is the same for students for whom Pell did and did not affect initial enrollments, then the 
bias should be symmetric across both groups, and while the overall parameter may be 
biased by these unobservables, the overall parameter is not made up of two components.  
If we can control for these  unobservables in our empirical design, we can estimate a 
single parameter that is easily interpreted.  However, if the determinants of persistence 
are not constant across groups, then the parameter will remain a combination of the two 
aforementioned effects. 
 
A.  Time Series Identification 
One way to identify the effects of Pell grants is to compare changes in students’ 
outcomes after systematic changes in Pell grants occur.  For example, the Pell grant 
program began in 1973.  Previous work by Kane (1996) compares low-income student   18 
enrollment rates before and after the Pell program was established.  Kane finds that 
college rates grew about 2.6 percentage points slower for low-income students than other 
groups, suggesting that the Pell grant had little effect.  Other systematic changes in Pell 
grant formulae are described in Mortenson (1988).   For the study at hand, I am 
presenting evidence for a single cohort, so time-series variation will not be useful in 
identifying the effects of Pell. 
 
B.  Panel Identification 
Another way to identify the effects of Pell grants is to look at changes in students’ 
Pell grants over time.  While this seems like a promising strategy since the OBR data 
contain two years of data for a single cohort, there are a number of reasons that this 
strategy might be limited. 
  To see the limitations and possibilities of this identification strategy, we need to 
understand how variations over time are generated for a single individual.  There are 
really three basic reasons that a students’ Pell grant would change from one year to the 
next.  First, the generosity of the Pell grant may change.  This could be the result of 
systematic changes in the Pell formula or by a change in college tuition.  Such changes 
are likely to be exogenous, and if they generate enough variation, they may help 
researchers to accurately identify the effects of Pell grants.  Unfortunately, there is little 
variation over time in the period of time that the OBR data are available.  From the 1999-
2000 school year to the 2000-2001 school year, the maximum Pell grant increased from 
$3125 to $3300, a 5.6% increase.  Over the same time, tuition at Ohio schools increased 
by 5% across the board (OBR 2001).     19 
Another source of variation comes from changes in students’ college choices.  
Students may transfer to another school after the first year.  The corresponding change in 
tuition will generate variation in students’ Pell grants.  Unfortunately, this source of 
variation does not help identify the effects of Pell grants.  Students who transfer may 
have different abilities than those students who do not transfer.  For example, a student 
with high ability may transfer from a two- to a four-year college to gain access to more 
opportunities.  This students Pell grant would automatically increase.  However, this 
increase is correlated with the student’s ability and may confound causal estimates of the 
Pell grant.  Another reason why using variation from transfer behavior may be misleading 
is that the size of students Pell grants may affect transfer behavior making it even more 
difficult to interpret and identify the effects of Pell grants using variation caused by 
student transfer behavior.  Thus, changes in Pell grants resulting from transfer decisions 
will not generate variation in Pell  grants that can be legitimately used to identify the 
effect of Pell grants alone.   
A final reason that students’ Pell grants may change is due to changes in students’ 
circumstances.  Some changes may be legitimate sources of variation.  For example, a 
family of four with one child in college may have a second child come of college age 
causing the existing college student’s Pell grant to increase.  Similarly, a change in family 
size (e.g. birth of another child or separation) may increase a student’s Pell grant.  Even 
the natural aging of parents should increase students’ Pell grants although only slightly.  
However, there are other changes in family circumstances which may not be legitimate 
sources of variation.  For example, changes in income due to unemployment or health 
shocks may reduce family income and consequently increase students’ Pell grants from   20 
year to year.  These sources of variation may also affect the likelihood that a student 
persists in college.   
For panel identification strategies to be successful, variation in the Pell grants 
must come from sources that are exogenous from changes in students’ stop-out behavior.  
As mentioned above, the most legitimate changes come from changes in the Pell formula, 
changes in tuition, and changes in family size or sibling attendance.  I can use changes 
from these “legitimate” sources as instruments for actual changes in financial aid.   
  Constructing the instrument from changes in the Pell formula and tuition is 
straightforward.  I simply impute what students' Pell grants would have been during the 
2000-2001 school year assuming that their financial and family information is unchanged 
from the 1999-2000 school year.  The imputed 2000-01 Pell grant does not include 
variation from changes in students’ (or their families’) circumstances.  It only includes 
variation arising from changes in the Pell grant formula and tuition.   
Imputing student data not only allows me to isolate exogenous variation, but it 
also allows me to estimate data for many students for whom financial data are missing.  
In the 1999-2000 school year, 35,233 students filed FAFSA’s.  However, 12,143 of these 
students did not file FAFSA’s in the 2000-2001 school year (hereafter referred to as the 
“non-filers”).  These non-filers are not a random subset of all students.  These non-filers 
include 2/3 of all students who withdrew from college after the 1999-2000 school year. 
For these individuals, I am missing financial data and information about changes in their 
siblings’ college attendance for the  2000-2001 school year.  Since the imputation 
assumes that students’ financial information is unchanged from their first to second year 
of college, I can estimate data for these non-filers.    21 
  If I had data for all non-filers, I could estimate out the causal effect of Pell grants 
by using the imputed grant as an instrument for the actual grant.  The instrumental 
variable estimate would be an unbiased estimate of the effect.  Unfortunately, since the 
actual data are not available for non-filers, I can only estimate reduced-form regressions 
of stop-out behavior on the imputed Pell grant.  Since there is a significant, positive 
relationship between students’ imputed Pell grants and their actual Pell grants, the 
reduced-form estimates of the relationship between imputed Pell and stop-out behavior 
should give us a sense of the sign and significance of the effect of actual Pell grants, but 
the reduced-form estimates will not give a precise estimate of the magnitude of such an 
effect. 
   Table 3 contains the reduced-form regressions regressing student stop-out 
behavior against the imputed increase in a student’s Pell grant from one year to the next 
measured in thousands of dollars.  For students who withdrew or transfer, I impute the 
Pell grant students would have received if they remained at the same institution as their 
initial enrollment.  Column 1 shows the results with fixed effects for school of attendance 
but no covariates.  Column 2 shows the results without fixed effects for college of 
enrollment but with covariates for gender, age, campus living conditions, whether the 
student took the ACT exam, and grade point average in the students’ first years.  Column 
3 includes both fixed effects and covariates.   
  As Column 1 shows, students whose Pell grants increase are less likely to 
dropout.  Without covariates, the coefficient suggests that a $1,000 increase in a student’s 
Pell grants leads to an 8.6 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that the student 
withdraws.  With covariates, the estimated coefficient implies that a $1,000 increase in a   22 
student’s Pell grant corresponds to a 9.2 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that 
students withdraw.  These estimates suggest strongly and consistently that increases in 
financial aid decrease the likelihood that students withdraw from school. 
  Column 4 repeats the analysis focusing only on the students whose initial college 
enrollment was at a 4-year campus.  As before, the estimated coefficient is negative and 
significant.  A $1,000 increase in students’ imputed Pell grants corresponds to a 6.4 
percent reduction in the likelihood that students withdraw from college.   
Column 5 reports estimates when non-filers are excluded from the analysis.  As 
mentioned before, the students who filed FAFSA’s in both years are a non-random subset 
of all students.  Now the estimate is positive and significant.  A $1000 increase in a 
student’s financial aid corresponds to a 2 percentage point increase in the likelihood that 
a student withdraws.  I include the estimate of Column 5 to provide some hint of what the 
bias may be from excluding the “non-filers” in the previous columns.  When we include 
the “non-filers,” we get significant, negative relationships between increases in students’ 
Pell grants and the likelihood that students drop out; however, when these students are 
omitted, the estimates are positive and significant.   
One might be able to further refine the estimates of students’ Pell grants in the 
cases where data are missing by using information about students’ siblings.  If ages or 
graduation dates were known or could be approximated, I could include this information 
in the estimation of what students’ Pell grants would have been in the 2000-2001 school 
year.  Unfortunately, little information is available about students’ siblings for the non-
filers.
9   
                                                                 
9 Some information about the family (parental age, family size in 1999-2000, number of children in college 
in 1999-2000, parental marital status) may help predict changes in the number of children attending   23 
What conclusion should be drawn from the panel identification specifications?  
First, panel identification has only limited power to actually identify the effects of Pell 
grants.  Much of the variation created over time in a student’s Pell grant comes from 
sources which may also affect the probability that the student withdraws from school.  It 
would be inappropriate to use this type of variation to identify the effects of Pell.  
Second, the fact that many students, especially those who plan to withdraw from school, 
do not file FAFSA’s in both years makes it difficult to estimate the effect of financial aid.  
When we impute data for these people, we find estimates suggesting that increases in 
financial aid reduce the likelihood that students withdraw from college. 
 
C.  Cross Sectional Identification 
One might also identify the effects of need-based financial aid by comparing the 
need-based awards of different students at a single moment in time.  There are a number 
of reasons that students may have different need-based awards.  Students may differ from 
each other in terms of personal income and assets, family income and assets, family size, 
parental age, college of attendance, and enrollment status (full versus part time).  All of 
these differences will lead to differences in students’ need-based financial aid.  Much of 
this variation will not be helpful in identifying the effects of Pell grants.  These sources of 
variation will also likely affect students’ drop-out behavior independent of need-based 
awards. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
college; however, their predictive power is limited.  When I model changes in sibling attendance on these 
variables, I get a very low R-squared.  After rounding the predicted values to the nearest integer, the 
specification predicts that 0.05% of students who filed FAFSA’s in both periods would have had a change 
in the number of siblings attending college.  In reality, 20.5% of students had a change in the number of 
siblings attending college.   24 
However, there is some variation across individuals that might be useful.  In 
particular, differences in family size and the number of children in college may facilitate 
identification in a cross-section.  The Pell grant formula contains a number of 
discontinuities, the largest of which is based on family size and the number of students 
attending college.  Even these sources of variation may not be exogenous.  For example, 
if a family can only afford to send one child to school, they may choose the student who 
has the most potential to benefit from college.  This student’s Pell grant would likely be 
smaller than it would be for a comparable family that sent multiple children to school.  
However, in this example, comparing this solitary student to other families with multiple 
children attending would lead to a bias since the family with fewer children in college 
sent a child to college with a greater chance of succeeding.  As a result of this potential 
bias, I will primarily focus on results that take advantage of discontinuities in family size.   
I will also briefly show estimates based on discontinuities in both family size and the 
number of children in college. 
Table 4 shows the changes in Pell Grants that accompany changes in family size.  
The table shows three different schedules linking family size and the number of children 
attending college.
10  Each schedule corresponds to a different income level ($40,000, 
$50,000, or $60,000).  For example, among the families with $50,000 in income, a family 
of 2 with one in college would receive a Pell grant of $975.  If the family was actually a 
3-person family with one in college, then the Pell grant would be $1575 per person.  
Figure 1 shows similar comparisons for different family sizes.  There are three lines 
corresponding to family sizes of three, four, and five.  The Pell grants shown in the figure 
                                                                 
10 The computations assume that the family has no assets and that the students do not contribute to the 
family’s estimated family contribution.   25 
assume that only one child is attending college.  As seen, the differences in family size 
can lead to systematic differences in students’ Pell grants.  These systematic differences 
create discontinuities that can be exploited to estimate the effect of Pell grants on 
students. 
Assuming that the differences between family size are unrelated to a student’s 
success in college, comparisons can be made between families of different sizes who 
have the same number of children in college.  However, as Table 4 shows, there is 
heterogeneity in income (and thus Pell grant) within a given family size.  For 
discontinuity analysis to work, the families on either side of the discontinuity should be 
similar except for the discontinuity.  As a result, when making comparisons across family 
sizes, we need to stratify the groups so that comparisons are made across relatively 
homogeneous groups (e.g. people with similar income and assets). 
Intuitively, the easiest way to estimate the effect of the Pell grant while taking 
advantage of this discontinuity is to use a Wald estimator (Wald 1940).  To find the Wald 
estimator, one must first isolate two groups that are fairly homogeneous.  Across the 
groups, the Wald estimator is found by taking the ratio of the differences across groups of 
the dependent variable (stop-out behavior) and the independent variable (size of the Pell 
grant).  For example, suppose we could identify all people who have low income and few 
assets and have one child in college.   Some of these families are 2-person families and 
some are 3 -person families.  Assuming that family size is uncorrelated with an 
individual’s success in college, we could estimate a Wald estimator across these groups.  
Let yi be the average withdrawal rate for group i.  Group i takes on a value of 1 for the 
group of students in 2-person families with one in college and 2 for the group of students   26 
in 3-person families with one in college.  Let xi be the average Pell grant for group i.  The 







= b . 
The denominator should be the expected change in the Pell grant as a result of this 
discontinuity within this income-asset group.  The numerator would be the difference in 
stop-out rates between these groups. 
After computing the first Wald statistic, we could then create a Wald estimator 
between each income-asset grouping within the sets of 2- and 3-person families.  If we 
had  10 income-asset groupings, we would have 10 Wald estimators.  These Wald 
estimators can be combined by taking a weighted-average of the estimators (weighted by 
the number of observations in each group 2).  We could similarly create Wald estimators 
across adjacent groupings of family size.  For example, we could compare 3- and 4-
person families. Of course, in the estimation of each Wald statistic we would actually 
have multiple Wald statistics comparing income-asset groupings across each 
discontinuity.   
While this approach seems straightforward, other discontinuities in the Pell 
formula complicate the estimation of Wald statistics.  For example, there are some 
income ranges where students would receive the maximum Pell grant regardless of their 
family size or the number of children attending college.  The Wald statistic would not be 
defined (or would be greatly inflated) over these ranges.  Similarly, the Wald statistic will 
not be defined for families that would have received no Pell grant regardless of their 
family size or the number of children in college.  Since these groups will likely create 
additional noise in the estimation, we may want to exclude these groups at times.   27 
Before estimating the Wald statistics, we need to create the income-asset 
groupings needed to create comparisons between homogeneous groups.  To create 
groupings, I re-estimate each student’s Pell grant assuming that he or she belonged to a 2-
person family with only 1 person attending college.  I then divide this group into 6 parts 
based on the revised Pell grant: 
1.  People whose Pell grant in a 2-person family with 1-in college would have 
been at the maximum of $3125. 
2.  People with revised Pell grants between $3124 and $2001. 
3.  People with revised Pell grants between $2000 and $1001. 
4.  People with revised Pell grants between $1000 and $401. 
5.  People with revised Pell grants at the Pell grant minimum of $400. 
6.  People with revised Pell grants equal to zero. 
  
Having uniform groupings across cells makes it much easier to estimate the Wald 
statistics and their standard errors.  Creating groupings around Pell grant values also 
avoids the problem that wealthier families are more likely to apply if they have more 
children.  These families are identified in group 6.  Also, I separate people who would 
have had the Pell grant minimum ($400) since in the Pell grant formula there is a 
discontinuity that allows families across a wider range of income to have this value of 
Pell grant.  I use these revised Pell grants only for the purpose of creating homogeneous 
groups (i.e. identifying families with similar assets and incomes).  When actually 
computing the Wald statistics, I use the actual Pell grants. 
Figure 2 shows an example of how the discontinuity works.  The sample of 
students is from group 3 above.  These students would have had similar Pell grants had   28 
their family size not been different. The left axis of Figure 2 plots these students' actual 
Pell grants across family size.  The Pell grant increases with the number of children.  The 
right-side axis of Figure 2 plots the stop-out rates for these students.  The stop-out rate 
declines for students with larger families.  Assuming that family size affects stop-out 
rates only through its effect on Pell grant size, then stop-out rates are negatively related to 
Pell grant size for these students.  We could produce similar figures for each 
homogeneous group of students. 
Table 5 shows the regression-based Wald estimates for the whole sample.  
Following Angrist (1991), the efficient combination of Wald estimators is just t he 
instrumental variables estimate of y (stop-out behavior) on x (size of Pell grant) where 
dummy variables for each homogeneous group and family size combination are used as 
instruments for x.  For example, if all families were 2, 3, or 4 people in size, then I would 
include 18 dummy variables as instruments (i.e. for each of the 6 homogenous 
income/asset groupings defined above, I would include 3 dummy variables for the 
possible family sizes). 
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the instrumental variable estimate when I estimate the 
regression excluding those for whom there is no variation in Pell grants.
11  The estimated 
effect is negative and significant.  A $1000 increase in Pell grants stemming from 
differences in family size corresponds to a 4 percentage point decrease in likelihood that 
a student drops out.  The result suggests that systematic differences in Pell grants lead to 
differences in stop-out rates for students.  Larger Pell grants reduce students’ 
probabilities of withdrawing. 
                                                                 
11 The maximum income in this group is $25,000.   29 
In Column 2 of Table 5, I include only the students who took the ACT exam.  The 
estimated effect suggests that a $1000 increase in students’ Pell grants leads to a 1.2 
percentage point reduction in the probability that a student withdraws although the result 
is not statistically significant.  In Column 3, I provide a small specification test.  Rather 
than use stop-out behavior as the dependent variable, I use the ACT score.  If the 
specification is correctly identified, there should be no significant differences between 
ACT scores between groups.  Indeed, the estimated relationship is indistinguishable from 
zero. 
Another way to estimate the effects of Pell is to use an instrumental variable 
approach where the “delinearized” Pell grant is used as an instrument for the actual Pell 
grant.  To do this, I run a regression of the actual Pell grant on a quartic in the key 
variables that determine the Pell grant (family income, family assets, family size, and 
number of children in the family attending college).  The residuals from this regression 
should be primarily made up of discontinuities in the Pell formula along these 
dimensions.  I then use the residual as an instrument for the actual Pell grant in a simple 
regression of stop-out behavior on students’ Pell grants.
12  I restrict the sample to students 
whose families have less than $150,000 in assets or less than $115,000 in annual income.  
The results appear in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.  Similar to Column 3, I find that a 
$1000 increase in Pell grants is associated with a 3 percentage point reduction in the 
likelihood that a student drops out.   
                                                                 
12 This is identical to running a regression of stop-out behavior on the Pell grant value and a quartic in the 
variables that determine the Pell grant.  These strategies estimate the same estimator with only a negligible 
change in standard errors.  I report the standard errors from the "instrument" approach since it may be 
intuitively easier to identify what source of variation is behind the estimated effect.   30 
In Column 5, I use a similar procedure except that I put campus fixed effects in 
the regression that predicts students’ Pell grants.  This is important since different campus 
costs can lead to differences in the size of students’ Pell grants.  Again, I use the residuals 
from this 1
st stage as an instrument in the next.  The results drop in magnitude and are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
The final column of Table 5 estimates the effects of Pell grants using both the 
discontinuities from family size and the number of children in college.  I use the same 
methodology except now I compare differences in Pell grants resulting from differences 
in the number of children going to college as well.  The results are similar to those in 
Column 1.  I find that a $1,000 increase in Pell corresponds to a 4 percent reduction in the 
likelihood that students withdraw. 
  What conclusions should be drawn?  First, while the estimates reinforce a 
negative relationship between the size of one’s Pell grant and stop-out behavior, they are 
not completely robust to specification.  When I focus on the sample taking the ACT 
(Column 2) and when I include additional campus level controls (Column 5), the results 
are indistinguishable from zero.  Additionally, there is substantial heterogeneity around 
the discontinuity and efforts to create comparisons among homogeneous groups may not 
fully account for the heterogeneity.  Overall the results seem supportive of those in the 
panel identification although the results are not robust to different subsamples. 
 
IV.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper set out to estimate the effects of Pell grants on student retention.  
Using panel and cross-sectional variation as sources of identification, this paper attempts   31 
to estimate the relationship.  The panel identification results suggest strongly that Pell 
reduces drop-out rates.  The regression-discontinuity results show similar results although 
they are more fragile.  The regression-discontinuity results, however, are less likely to be 
biased by other factors than the specifications which use cross-sectional variation.   
The finding that Pell grants affect student persistence has several policy 
implications.  Most importantly, it implies that federal and state needs-based policies and 
aid matter and that they influence the likelihood that students continue from year to year 
in college.  Even if these aid programs have no effect on enrollment (as Kane 1999 and 
Leslie and Brinkman 1987 show), need-based programs may impact educational 
attainment.  The finding that aid increases persistence may suggest that front-loaded 
financial aid programs may improve student retention in the first years of college.
13   
The results in this paper may also support conclusions in Dynarski (2002) and 
Turner and Bound (2002).  These papers focused on beneficiaries of the Social Security 
Student Benefit Program and the G. I. Bill respectively.  The papers found that need-
based aid affected both enrollment and completion.   
While many policymakers may view this finding that need-based aid improves 
retention as being "good" for society, it is not clear that this is so.  As Jonathan Guryan 
points out in the comments that follow this chapter, more education may not be optimal 
for all students in society.  There may be a number of students who do not have the skills 
and for whom a college degree may not improve earnings.  If these students are the 
marginal students for whom the Pell grant program influences college persistence, then 
the measured effect in this paper may reflect an inefficient use of societal resources.   
                                                                 
13 DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2002) finds that frontloaded aid programs have a "modest impact" on 
student retention.   32 
In order to fully resolve the question of whether increased persistence is "good" 
for society, we would need to know how an additional year of education affects the 
earnings for these marginal students.  In estimates of the returns of education for the 
entire population, Jaeger and Page (1996) argue that the returns to a second year of 
college have significant effects on earnings, particularly if students finish an Associate's 
Degree.  These estimates suggest that persistence into the second year of college is a 
positive outcome; however, the estimated return in Jaeger and Page (1996) is for the 
whole population.  It is not clear that this estimated return would be the same for the 
marginal students affected by Pell grants.  Evidence from Tobias (2000) suggests that the 
returns to education are concentrated at the highest ability students and remain small for 
lower ability students.  Moreover, as Sarah Turner points out elsewhere in this volume, 
the marginal students are likely less prepared for college and more likely to hold a GED 
than a high school diploma.
14  There is little empirical evidence on the returns to an 
additional year of college for these students.   
Finally, there are two empirical points that should be considered in interpreting 
the results in this paper.  First, the paper focuses solely on student persistence between 
the first and second year of college in adjacent years.  Researchers have documented the 
growing trend of students to take breaks at various times during college (e.g. Turner's 
chapter in this volume).  DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2002) examine enrollment 
probabilities over a longer stretch of time.  They find that need-based aid has no long-run 
effect on enrollment probabilities.  They are using a sample in which students repeatedly 
enter and exit higher education.  While the sample they use focuses on students who 
                                                                 
14 Many of these students enroll in college remediation.  Ongoing research by Bettinger and Long (2003) 
examines the effect college remediation on college outcomes and student earnings.   33 
initially enrolled at a four-year campus, their finding suggests that examining the effect of 
financial aid on retention over a longer stretch of time may be important. 
Second, as states continue to gather more complete and expansive data on their 
students, economists and others researchers will be able to employ methods that exploit 
variation in Pell grant formulae.  However, even if better data are available, researchers 
should take care in how they deal with changes in Pell grant eligibility and missing data.  
Students who leave school after their first year are less likely to file additional FAFSA's 
making it difficult for researchers to measure their financial status.  Research that fails to 
control for these missing data may be biased.  
   34 
Table 1.  Average Student Characteristics 
  4-year College  2-year College 
Out of State Student  .103  .032 
Lives on Campus  .557  .024 





Non-White  .134  .173 




Left Institution After 1 year  .278  .491 
Left Higher Education After 1 Year  .201  .431 
Took ACT exam  .750  .446 




Filed FAFSA for Fall 1999  .653  .628 








Filed FAFSA for Fall 2000  .490  .399 














Source: Author's calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents 
Notes: Standard deviations appear for non-binary variables.  Data are for full-time students who first 
entered Ohio public colleges and/or universities in Fall 1999.  Uncovered financial need equals tuition less 
the estimated family contribution from the FAFSA less any Pell Grant for which the student was eligible.   35 
Table 2.  Association Between Financial Aid and Stop-out Behavior 
  Dependent Variable = Student "Stopped-out" 
  All Students    Students Taking ACT 
Exam 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 




















































































   




Freshman Grade Point 
Average 






  -.132 
(.003) 
Includes HS GPA 
controls 
No  No  No 
 
No    Yes  Yes 
Includes Race Fixed 
Effects 
No  Yes  Yes  No    Yes  Yes 
Includes Campus Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  No    Yes  Yes 
R-squared  .108  .112  .204  .192    .091  .169 
N  37028  30851  29778  29778    24627  24012 
Source: Author's calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents 
Notes: White standard errors are in parentheses.  Data are for full-time students who first entered Ohio 
public colleges and/or universities in Fall 1999.  The sample varies across columns due to missing data on 
student characteristics or first-year GPA data.   36 
Table 3.  OLS Regressions of Stop-out Behavior on Changes in Pell Grants:   
Results with Panel Data 
Dep Var = Student 
Stopped-out 
Full Sample: Students Filing 
FAFSA in 1999-00 
  4-yr 
students 
Students Filing 
FAFSA both years 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) 
Imputed Increase in 













Level of Financial Aid in 
1999-2000 (000’s) 










Includes Covariates  No  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Includes Campus Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  No  Yes    Yes  Yes 
N  35233  35233  35233    21506  24116 
Source: Author's calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents 
Notes:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Samples in Columns 1 -3 include all students who 
FAFSA’s in 1999-2000.  Column 4 focuses only on students who attended a 4-yr college in 1999-2000.  
Column 5 includes only those students who applied for financial aid in both years.  Covariates include an 
indicator for whether the student was from out of state, age, gender, whether the student lives on campus, 
whether the student took the ACT exam, students’ freshman GPA, and controls for race.     37 
Table 4.  Pell Grant by Family Size and the Number of Children in College 
 
Number of Children in College  Income=$40,000 
1  2  3  4 
2  $2175  $2475  --  -- 
3  $2875  $2775  $2775  -- 
4  $3125  $3125  $2975  $2875 
5  $3125  $3125  $3125  $3075 
Number in 
Family 
6  $3125  $3125  $3125  $3125 
           
Number of Children in College  Income=$50,000 
1  2  3  4 
2  $975  $1775  --  -- 
3  $1575  $2175  $2275  -- 
4  $2325  $2425  $2575  $2575 
5  $3125  $2825  $2775  $2775 
Number in 
Family 
6  $3125  $3125  $3075  $2975 
           
Number of Children in College  Income=$60,000 
1  2  3  4 
2  $0  $975  --  -- 
3  $400  $1475  $1775  -- 
4  $1075  $1825  $2175  $2275 
5  $1875  $2275  $2375  $2475 
Number in 
Family 
6  $2675  $2675  $2675  $2675 
Source: Author's calculations.  
Notes: Calculations assume that the families have zero assets and no student contribution in the 
computation of the estimated family contribution.  Calculations also assume that students attend high-cost 
institutions.   38 
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Level of Pell Grant in 













N  6114  4470  4470  29936  29936  6398 
Source: Author's calculations from unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents 
Notes: White standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Columns 1-3 and 6 include only students with 
positive Pell grants less than the maximum.  In Columns 4-5, the instrument for “Level of Pell Grant” is the 
residual from a regression of Pell grant on a quartic of the key variables determining Pell grants (family 
income, assets, family size, number of children in college).  The IV columns exclude families with income 
greater than $115,000 or assets greater than $150,000.  Campus fixed effects are included in the 1
st stage of 
the specification in Column 5 to control for the fact that different school costs will lead to different size Pell 
grants.   39 
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Source: Author's Calculations 
Notes: The estimated Pell grants are formulated assuming no assets or student contribution.  The Pell grants 
further assume that only one person from the family is attending a high cost institution.  40 
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Parents' total # children






Source: Author's calculations from  unpublished data from the Ohio Board of Regents 
Notes: Sample is restricted to families whose assets and income are such that their 
college-age children would have had a Pell grant between one and two thousand 
dollars if they had only had one child.   
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